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Collective defined-contribution (CDC) 
a b s t r a c t 
Individual retirement savings schemes could benefit from risk-sharing mechanisms between generations 
that take behavioral aspects into account. We introduce a novel risk-sharing mechanism that incorporates 
nominal loss-aversion in two ways. First, the system avoids out-of-pocket wealth transfers by sharing 
only a fraction of positive returns over a high-water mark of pension assets. Secondly, payments from 
a generation insurance fund are targeted at nominal pension shortfalls below a reference point, which 
mitigates the loss experience at retirement. From a simulation of overlapping generations with stochastic 
asset returns and interest rates we find that the generation insurance scheme outperforms a pure indi- 
vidual retirement scheme by a significant margin: a similar risk of pension shortfall can be achieved with 
a contribution rate that is up to 20% lower. The efficiency gains vary with the extent of risk sharing over 
generations but remain large for sensible parameter values. 



















































Individual retirement accounts suffer from the problem that as-
et returns and interest rates are volatile and unpredictable. Un-
er defined-contribution (DC) or cash-balance systems, this means
hat the participants run considerable risks of a less-than-desirable
ension outcome. These risks can be mitigated by having a risk-
haring mechanism that spreads risks between generations, see
ollier (2008), Beetsma and Bovenberg (2009), Cui et al. (2011),
eetsma et al. (2012) and Novy-Marx and Rauh (2014) . The effi-
iency is present in existing defined benefit (DB) plans, as long as
he opacity of those plans is not used to camouflage underfunding
nd take excessive investment risks, see Andonov et al. (2016) . 
In contrast to the economic efficiency of intergenerational sol-
darity, public support for risk-sharing between generations is de-
lining. The current “pension crisis” in the Netherlands, the intro-
uction of individual retirement accounts in the UK, and the de-
erioration of defined-benefit (DB) schemes in the US are due to
uspicions from old and young generations that the pension sys-
em does not benefit them to the extent that it should. From the
erspective of limited rationality and trust in financial institutions,
his is understandable: if participants cannot assess whether their
ension contributions are beneficial to their own retirement out-
ome, support for the system declines. ∗ Corresponding author. 





378-4266/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. An important consideration with respect to intergenerational
nsurance is loss aversion, i.e., people are more sensitive to
osses than to gains. The reluctance to realize small losses leads
o suboptimal choices in investment and savings decisions, see
dean (1998), Weber and Camerer (1998), Genesove and Mayer
2001), Feng and Seasholes (2005), Coval and Shumway (2005) and
razzini (2006) . Given the evidence, loss-averse preferences should
eature in the design of a pension system, see also Broadbent et al.
2006) . 
In this paper, we analyze a generation-insurance pension
cheme with a risk sharing mechanism that incorporates the con-
ept of loss aversion. Participants are loss averse with respect to
wo anchors: (1) the final pension outcome and (2) their interme-
iate pension wealth. Our design allows that shortfalls of pension
utcomes relative to a reference point of retirement benefits are
itigated through a generation insurance fund. Moreover, the pro-
osed system offers the flexibility to collect insurance premia only
n situations where intermediate pension wealth is at an all-time
igh. 
The first feature, mitigating pension shortfalls, is established by
aving a generation-insurance fund that (partly) compensates par-
icipants for shortfalls in the pension outcome at the retirement
ge. The pension outcome is the level of benefits divided by the av-
rage lifetime wage and a shortfall is the extent to which the out-
ome is below 70%. So, a shortfall below 70% leads to a compensa-
ion payment from the insurance fund (with some maxima for the
utflow of the fund), while a surplus above 70% is unchanged. 




















































































































1 In practice, the pension scheme could work with a sensible default option with 
an opt-out clause to offer the opportunity to adjust the investment mix to personal 
tastes. The second feature, avoiding out-of-pocket contributions to
generation insurance, is accomplished by using a return-sharing
mechanism: insurance premiums are collected as a fraction of pos-
itive returns, but only when assets are above a high-water mark.
So, premia are only paid in times which participants will unequiv-
ocally perceive as “good”: returns are positive, and the assets in the
individual account are exceeding the previous highest level. This
makes the insurance fund an attractive proposition for participants
who are averse to suffering nominal losses. 
Collecting premia by “shaving off” some of the investment re-
turn in good times is similar to the Save More Tomorrow scheme
of Thaler and Benartzi (2004) . In their scheme, employees are in-
duced to save more by having a default fraction of wage increases
being put in a savings account. It assumes employees are loss
averse in nominal terms, so that they are reluctant to a decrease
in their nominal income, see Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Kah-
neman et al. (1991) . Since the contribution to the savings plan is
only increased after a wage rise, the change in take home pay for
a worker remains non-negative. 
A problem with existing mechanisms for risk-sharing in the
pension domain is their opacity: participants cannot easily com-
pute what they pay into the system and what they get from it. Van
Rooij et al. (2011) and Van Rooij et al. (2012) find that the extent of
financial literacy (understanding basic concepts) has a significant
impact on retirement planning and savings outcomes. Brown and
Weisbenner (2014) find that many people hold wrong beliefs about
pension plan parameters, which hurts their retirement outcome.
This problem is even worse if free financial advice is not used by
the people who need it most, see Bhattacharya et al. (2012) . One of
the advantages of our proposed system is that the features of the
risk-sharing mechanism are transparent and easy to understand.
The insurance scheme can be explained as being similar to health
insurance, where everyone pays contributions, but payments are
only made when a participant incurs treatment costs. Likewise,
the generation insurance fund takes in insurance premiums from
all participants, but only pays out in case of pension shortfalls.
The transparency and the understandability of the proposed sys-
tem helps people in their personal financial planning. 
The system we analyze can be characterized as a collective in-
dividual defined contribution (CDC) scheme. The scheme resembles
aspects of DB-schemes such as collective risk-sharing and manda-
tory saving. Moreover, people save individually and, consequently,
there should not be discussions about ownership rights of capital
like those that occur within DB-schemes. Obviously, in our setup
discussions could possibly emerge about the ownership of the in-
surance fund but the clarity of having a given size of the insurance
fund facilitates understanding of the trade-offs involved. 
To test the efficiency of the risk sharing model we perform sim-
ulations of the performance of our plan using stochastic asset re-
turns and interest rates in an overlapping-generations model. The
approach of a Monte-Carlo simulation enables us to model a realis-
tic evolution of returns, contributions and payouts of the insurance
fund. We evaluate pension outcomes with loss averse value func-
tions as well as a classical power utility function, to have a broad
view of the gains in the efficiency of pension outcomes. 
The simulation outcomes show that under a linear loss-averse
utility function our generation insurance scheme with a contribu-
tion rate of 10% achieves the same certainty equivalent pension
as an individual DC-scheme with a contribution rate of 10.8%. If
only downside risk on the final pension outcome is important then
a contribution level of 12.7% in an individual system is needed
to match the downside risk of our insurance scheme. These out-
comes confirm the benefits to using a generation insurance fund
that spreads risks over generations. 
The difference in contribution rates depends on the parameters
used for the generation insurance scheme and the risk measuresed to match pension outcomes, but remains large and signifi-
ant in all cases. Moreover, we show that the outcomes are not
riven by a nonlinear shift in wealth between generations. The re-
ults confirm that a simple scheme that uses behavioral insights
or its design can achieve a large share of the benefits that come
rom sharing risks between generations. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
ection 3 presents the simulation results. Section 4 discusses im-
lementation issues. Section 5 concludes. 
. Modeling pension outcomes with risk sharing 
We model the participant to a retirement scheme as an agent
ho cares only about the pension annuity at retirement. He is not
ndifferent to higher pension contributions, but we evaluate that
eparately, from the perspective of a social planner. This setup en-
bles us to isolate the risk-return properties of the risk-sharing
cheme while avoiding complexities such as the interaction be-
ween retirement saving, consumption, health and housing wealth.
.1. The model 
The basic building block of the model is an individual retire-
ent account. Participants pay a fixed contribution rate as a frac-
ion of wages which accumulates in the retirement account with
nvestment returns. The life-cycle investment mix is set by the
und and is identical for each individual of a certain age. The add-
n component is an insurance fund that obtains premia from the
sset returns of participants above a high-water mark, and pays
ut a compensation for each retiring generation who faces a pen-
ion shortfall below 70% of the average wage. The payout of the in-
urance fund is capped at a percentage of total assets of the fund,
o that the fund is sustainable across generations. 
We model M + T overlapping generations that each have an ac-
ive working life of T years, where M generations reach retirement.
 new generation enters the working population in each year. We
se t i to denote working time for generation i = 1 , . . . , M. Calen-
ar years evolve with a time index τ and since time starts at 0,
e have that τ = t i + i − 1 . Each generation i consists of n τit em-
loyees at time τ . For notational clarity, the equations that model
he evolution of a variable specific to one generation, we drop the
ubscript i of t i . 
A generation i at working age t builds up pension assets A it , as
ollows: 
 it = A i,t−1 · (1 + R p τ ) + c · W it , (1)
nd 
 i 0 = 0 (2)
here R 
p 
τ is the portfolio return at calendar time τ and c is the
ontribution rate to the individual retirement account, and W it is
he wage of generation i at age t . The portfolio return is the result
f a fraction invested in stocks and bond, the dynamics of which
re specified below. 
The fraction in stocks αt is initially 100% and declines from
ear t ∗. In the baseline simulation, t ∗ is such that the fraction
tocks declines with 10%-points each year from age 50, reaching 0%
tocks at age 60. In the simulations we analyze the sensitivity to
his parameter. This approach follows from a life-cycle perspective,
here labor income becomes a decreasing proportion of lifetime
ealth with age, 1 see Campbell and Viceira (2003) . We test for























































































































2 We could think of a variant whereby the insurance premium is paid by the 
employer so that the salience of an out-of-pocket cost for the participant is reduced. he sensitivity of the outcomes to the riskiness of the asset mix in
ection 3.4 . 
The real wage profile ˜ W t , t = 1 , . . . , T , is the same for every
eneration, i.e., 
 it = ˜ W t , for i = 1 , . . . , M, and t = 1 , . . . , T (3)
nd the average real wage is W̄ . We specify the exact age-related
age profile by using an average profile for a UK employee, see
elow. 
Starting in year T , pension benefits are obtained by a single re-
iring generation. In year τ = T + i − 1 , the pension benefit PB τ of
he retiring generation is equal to capital divided by the average
age, W̄ , and the costs of a pension annuity, i.e., 
 B τ = A iT / 
(
W̄ · a r τ
)
(4) 
here a r τ is the annuity cost for receiving 1 in every year of re-
irement, using the interest rate r τ at time τ and the survivorship
able for discounting the future payments. The variable PB τ is a
ension level in terms of the fraction of average wage. 
The target level of pension benefits is PB target so that a pension
hortfall for generation i at time τ = T + i − 1 is defined as 
 S F τ = max ( P B target − P B τ , 0 ) (5) 
ith monetary value P S F τ · a r τ · W̄ . 
The inflow into the insurance fund consists of two components:
hare of excess returns and a fixed insurance contribution. The
hare of excess returns is a fraction of positive returns on the par-
icipant’s assets above the “high-water mark”, where high-water
ark (HWM) is simply the previous highest level of asset. Using
he HWM ensures that insurance contributions only occur when
he pension assets are higher than before. Taking a fraction from
ositive returns ensures that declines in asset values are not made
orse, and that people contribute only in good years, i.e., when
eturns are positive. 
The high-water mark is a natural reference point, as people use
istorical highs to form a reference point beyond which they de-
ode outcomes as losses. Investors of an acquiring firm are using
imilar frames when considering a takeover bid of a company, see
aker et al. (2012) . In the hedge fund industry, high-water marks
re used in the computation of performance fees, so that investors
nly pay these fees when assets are higher than previously reached
ighs and not otherwise, see Goetzmann et al. (2003) . 
The mechanism for collecting premia as a fraction of returns
bove the high-water mark is similar in spirit to the “Save More
omorrow” program of Thaler and Benartzi (2004) . Save More To-
orrow defers the saving decision to the moment of a wage rise.
t that point, a fraction of the wage increase goes into the savings
ccount, so that take-home pay is not decreasing due to increased
avings. Thaler and Benartzi find that the scheme works well, with
0% of employees joining, whose subsequent savings rate increases
y 10%-points over time. The reason for the success is that peo-
le are much more comfortable in putting aside a fraction of their
age for their “future self” when it does not hurt their take-home
ay. The smart design of the savings system overcomes potential
elf-control problems, triggered by the nominal losses from an ad
oc increase in savings. Our system uses a similar principle: peo-
le give up a small fraction of the upside for their future self, in
xpectation. 
In the model, the return-related premium is a fraction κ of
ny positive asset growth in the pension account that exceeds the
igh-water mark. The high-water mark H for generation i at age t
s given by 
 it = max ( H i,t−1 , A it ) . (6) 
Growth of the high-water mark is driven by growth in pension
ssets. Pension assets increase either through positive investmenteturns or by the contribution in the personal retirement account.
he return-related insurance premium is only paid when the in-
rease in the high-water originates from positive investment re-
urns, i.e., participants of the pension scheme only contribute in
imes that are perceived to be good. 
A second source of inflow to the insurance fund is a fixed in-
urance fee f as a fraction wages and a direct payment from the
articipant. It fits into the frame of other types of insurance where
 positive premium is paid and a payout is triggered in adverse
cenarios. Given the loss-averse framework that we use, a direct
nsurance cost is not favored. 2 However, we include it to compare
he effects to the return-based premium. The total insurance con-
ribution, for generation i at time t is given by 
 it = f · W it + 
{
κR p 
i + t−1 A i,t−1 
0 




In practice, the insurance premium, through either f or κ , could
e made dependent on the asset level of the insurance fund. This
ight increase efficiency further, but at the costs of added com-
lexity and discretion by the pension fund board, which we try to
void. For the aim of the paper, we leave f and κ fixed. 
Given the systematic risk of insurance pay-outs, the insurance
und should invest in assets that have a low (or negative) corre-
ation with the investment returns of participants. This could be
 combination of low-risk assets, such as government bonds or
oney market funds, assets with low beta and volatility, and pos-
ibly assets with a negative correlation with risky assets, such as
unds and securities with a short exposure to the stock market. In
ur setup, the fund simply investments in short-term money mar-
et instruments: The assets of the insurance fund yield the short-
erm interest rate, r τ , so that the evolution of the asset value of
he insurance fund, IF τ is given by 
 F τ = I F τ−1 · ( 1 + r τ ) + 
∑ 
i ∈ G τ
C i t i , (8) 
here G τ contains the active generations at time τ and t i = τ − i +
 . Note that, at each year τ = 1 , . . . , T , the number of active gener-
tions increases with 1. After year T , the number of active genera-
ions remain constant, as one generation retires and another enters
he workforce. 
If a generation has a pension shortfall, the insurance fund pays
ut a fraction of its assets to (partly) compensate for the shortfall.
nly up to a maximum fraction F of the insurance fund is paid in
ny year, so that the fraction of the pension shortfall paid is 
 P P τ = min 
(
P S F τ , 
I F τ · F 
a r τ · W̄ 
)
(9) 
If generation i has a pension shortfall at its retirement year
= T + i − 1 , it receives a compensation that is at maximum equal
o the shortfall, but less if the maximum amount available, F · IF τ ,
s not enough to cover the shortfall. The payout structure of the in-
urance fund is similar to that of Beetsma et al. (2012) , who model
 linear payout below a threshold of consumption. 
In the overlapping generations model, the first payout occurs
hen the first generation retires, i.e., at τ = T . From that point on-
ards, the sum of wages is constant and insurance payouts can be
ade each year, depending on whether the retiring generation has
 pension shortfall. 
With the share of the payout for an individual being propor-
ional to the monetary value of the transfer, there is no signifi-
ant redistribution across low-growth and high-growth wage pro-
les. This is due to the fact that pension capital accumulated in
272 M.-J. Boes, A. Siegmann / Journal of Banking and Finance 92 (2018) 269–279 
Fig. 1. Demographics and wage profile. 
This figure shows the demographical distribution and wage profile that is used for the generations in the model. They are obtained from the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS). Panel A has the survival probabilities as of age 65 from the 2060 Projection of survival probabilities. (We assume 100% survival until age 68, see the text). Panel B 


































































d  T years is roughly proportional to the average contribution. Our
simulations support this (not reported). The rule of payout share
equals capital share is easily communicated and is fair: low-growth
earners have contributed less over their working life and will also
receive less from the fund. Under the rule, the payout in terms
of final pension will be similar to what they could have received
when being in a separate pension fund with similar low-growth
earners. 
With the compensation from the insurance fund, the adjusted
pension, PBA τ for generation i becomes 
P B A τ = P B τ + IP P τ (10)
The model results in M generations with adjusted pension
benefits for which we can compute the utility. Generations
M + 1 , . . . , M + T are active in paying contributions but do not
reach retirement at the planning horizon of the model. 
2.2. Age and wage profile 
Generations enter the workforce at age 23 and retire at 68, i.e.,
T = 45. A retirement age of 68 is relatively high for current stan-
dards, but not implausible given the planned rises in statutory re-
tirement ages in the UK and other countries. 
To simplify the computation of the overlapping generations
model, we assume a 100% survival rate until age 68. Then, for the
computation of the cost of a pension annuity at 68, we use the
predicted UK survival probabilities in 2060 as provided by the Of-
fice for National Statistics (ONS), see Fig. 1 , panel A. 
For the wage profile we take the average UK wage per age
group in 2004–2012, as provided by the Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings, also from the ONS. The survey measures wages per
cohort of 10 years which we interpolate and approximate using a
quadratic polynomial, see Fig. 1. 
In reality, wage growth is not deterministic, and possibly corre-
lated with stock returns. However, our results in terms of the rela-
tive advantage of generation insurance remain qualitatively similar
when we take this into account (results available upon request).
The intuition for this is that wage growth paths and the correla-
tion structure affect the outcomes for individual DC and generationnsurance in similar ways, so that the relative difference does not
hange significantly. 
The wage profile in panel B of Fig. 1 is representative of wages
ncreasing over the lifetime, leveling off, and slightly decreasing at
igher ages. The decrease in wages at an older age can be seen as
arly retirement by a fraction of the population, accepting a lower-
aid job, or working part-time. 
.3. Economic parameters and distributional assumptions 
To facilitate the aggregation and comparison of outcomes across
ifferent generations, we assume that real (corrected for inflation)
age and price growth are zero. We choose parameters for interest
ates and the risky returns accordingly, i.e. reflecting a real setup
ith zero inflation and adjusting the mean asset returns accord-
ngly. 
Stock returns are normally distributed with a real mean of 6%
nd volatility of 20%, which are similar to what is typically found
n the literature, see Guidolin and Timmermann (2005) . The real
nterest rate, r τ , is normally distributed with a mean of 2% and
tandard deviation of 1% and is independently drawn from year
o year, i.e., interest rates are i.i.d. This is the most simple rep-
esentation of interest-rate uncertainty but quite sufficient for our
urposes. Increasing the sophistication of modeling the short- and
ong-term interest rate will improve the realism of pension out-
omes, but does not change the comparative performance of the
wo pension schemes that we analyze. 
Bond returns are related to changes in the interest rates. As-
uming a duration of , we have a direct relation between bond
eturns and short-term interest rates r τ , given by 
 
b 
τ = 0 . 01 + r τ −  · ( r τ − r τ−1 ) (11)
here the first term in ( 11 ) implies a carry return, or term pre-
ium of one percent. The relation in ( 11 ) is similar to that of
oevenaars et al. (2008) . For the rest of the paper we use a bond
uration of 5. 
Historically, stock returns and interest rates have shown pro-
onged periods of zero, positive or negative correlation, see
slanidis and Christiansen (2014) . However, we refrain from
eveloping a model for conditional dependence or a view on the




























































Fig. 2. Two example outcomes. 
The figure shows the pension outcomes for two simulation runs. The solid lines 
represent the outcomes of the generation insurance model with 10% contribution, 
20% return sharing and 20% maximum payout (as a fraction of the insurance fund). 





















orrect correlation parameter and choose to leave the correlation
t zero. 
In our simulation setup we could accommodate for stochastic
age growth, correlated with stock returns, as in Lucas and Zeldes
2006) , but refrain from doing so to avoid unnecessary complex-
ty. Moreover, we find that modeling stochastic wage growth does
ot impact the outcomes significantly (results are available upon
equest). 
For the annuity costs of a pension, we assume that the term-
pread is equal to the inflation rate, so that the current short-term
nterest rate is the annuity interest rate for computing the cost of
 pension annuity at retirement. The computation for the pension
nnuity is in Eq. (4) above. 
.4. Simulation setup 
We compute the performance of the pension plan using a
onte-Carlo simulation in an overlapping generations model with
early generations. We focus on the retirement outcome only, ab-
tracting from labor income after retirement, consumption patterns
r housing wealth that could influence the possible pension out-
omes and living standards for an individual, but are beyond the
cope of this analysis. 
To assess the performance of generation insurance, the simula-
ion outcomes are evaluated against the outcomes of a purely indi-
idual system. The purely individual retirement scheme has no risk
haring between generations and resembles the 401(k) system in
he US or the recently re-designed second pillar retirement scheme
n the UK. The simulation results for the individual-DC have the
ame per-scenario asset returns and asset mix as generation in-
urance and is obtained in the model above by setting the all in-
urance parameters to zero, i.e., there are no contributions to and
ayouts from the generation insurance fund. 
To illustrate the dynamics of the pension plan, sample out-
omes for two simulation runs are shown in Fig. 2. 
The two simulation runs exemplify how the generation insur-
nce leads to a lower downside risk (below 0.7 of average wage) at
he cost of a lower upside potential. Both panels have higher maxi-
ums for individual DC pension outcomes, but also lower minima.
he generation insurance scheme provides protection for pension
utcomes below 0.7. 
.5. Evaluating pension outcomes 
To evaluate the pension outcomes for different risk sharing pa-
ameters we assume the pension fund participant maximizes the
tility of final pension. Final pension is the pension benefit in
erms of the fraction of average wage, adjusted with a potential
nsurance payout, i.e., PBA τ . 
We consider loss-averse utility functions and the classical
ower utility function. Loss averse utility functions put an explicit
enalty on realizations below a reference point and are rooted
n behavioral research on decision making under uncertainty, see
ahneman and Tversky (1979) . Evidence for loss aversion in many
conomics settings as well as among finance professionals, see
haler and Benartzi (2004), Abdellaoui et al. (2013) and Barberis
2013) . 3 
The loss averse utility functions evaluate the value of the pen-
ion outcome, PBA τ , relative to the reference point of 70% of aver-
ge wage, i.e., the objective is 
ax v ( P B A τ − 0 . 70 ) (12) 3 The most complete framework for decision making is prospect theory, which 
lso involves the distortion of probabilities. However, for the purpose of the objec- 
ive analysis we only consider loss aversion here. 
w  
q  
r  here v ( · ) is a value function. The first loss-averse value function
s the linear formulation given by 
 ( x ) = 
{
x if x ≥ 0 
λ1 · x if x < 0 , (13) 
here λ1 > 1 is the degree of loss aversion, so that outcomes
elow 70% of average wage obtain an extra penalty. The kinked-
haped utility function is the most succinct way of modeling loss-
verse preferences and is used by for example Barberis et al.
2001) to explain the equity premium. It is the linearized version
f the original by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , who find risk-
eeking behavior in the loss domain. We choose a loss aversion
arameter λ1 = 10 that is rather high relative to Tversky and Kah-
eman’s value of 2.25, to account for the large disutility of below-
arget pension outcomes. 
A potential concern with the linear loss averse utility function
n ( 14 ) is that two small shortfalls are penalized similarly to one
hortfall that is twice as large, i.e., it could have too little weight
n large shortfalls. To take this into account, an alternative formu-
ation uses a quadratic penalty on losses: 
 ( x ) = 
{
x if x ≥ 0 
x − λ2 · ( a · x ) 2 if x < 0 , (14) 
here λ2 is the coefficient of quadratic loss aversion. The use of a
uadratic penalty is similar to the use of downside deviation as a
isk measure in asset-liability management for pension funds, see










































































































t  Boender et al. (2007) . The parameter a is used to scale the out-
comes so that pension outcomes below 0.65 carry a larger penalty
than in the linear case, i.e., to adjust for the fractional nature of
the pension outcomes. The loss aversion parameter λ2 is again 10. 
As a third loss averse specification we consider is the probability
of a pension shortfall versus the reference point of 70% of average
wage. This is the most simple representation of loss averse prefer-
ences, has a straightforward interpretation and is used by pension
funds in the Asset/Liability Management process. 
A potential problem with loss averse utility functions is that
they lead to risk-seeking behavior in the loss domain. Even for the
linearized and quadratic functions, Siegmann and Lucas (2005) find
that risk-taking increases with the distance to the reference point,
both in gains and in losses. It is caused by the local curvature of
the loss aversion functions, that is either linear or quadratic, but
not sufficiently curved to mitigate risk taking when the distance to
the reference point increases. To avoid this problem we also con-
sider a classical power utility function 
 ( x ) = 1 
1 − γ · x 
1 −γ (15)
where γ is a risk aversion parameter and utility is computed over
pension outcomes, i.e., the PBA τ in Eq. (10) . Power utility is one of
the most commonly used utility functions and can fit data well in
many domains, see Wakker (2008) . Power utility exhibits Constant
Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA), so that the relative curvature of the
utility function is constant across wealth. This is consistent with
the idea that relative (percentage-wise) changes in wealth matter.
It is closely related to the manipulation-proof performance mea-
sure of Goetzmann et al. (2007) . 
For the coefficient of relative risk aversion, Dalal and Arshana-
palli (1993) find a value of 1.3 based on the holdings of risky as-
sets by US-households. Guisoet al. (2013) find values distributed
uniformly between 1 and 10, based on survey responses about tak-
ing a gamble that delivers either €0 or €10,0 0 0, with equal prob-
ability. However, relative risk aversions higher than 5 are seen as
extremely risk averse in real-life situations. Chiappori and Paiella
(2011) find a median value of 3 based on the stock holdings of Ital-
ian households, and we take that value, i.e., 3, to represent a me-
dian level of risk aversion in evaluating the power utility of pen-
sion outcomes. 
In the presentation of the results, we convert utility outcomes
to certainty-equivalent utility. This is the value of the pension ben-
efit PBA τ that gives the same utility as the average utility over all
(risky) outcomes. It facilitates interpretation and provides a useful
yardstick to compare the different outcomes. 
3. Performance evaluation 
3.1. Baseline results 
As described above, we assess the performance of generation
insurance we compare the descriptive statistics and utility out-
comes to that of the purely individual system, i.e., with f = κ = 0 .
Table 1 shows our baseline results based on 10 0 0 simulations of
100 generations. 4 . 
The top row in Table 1 shows the results for the individual re-
tirement (DC)-scheme with a 10% annual contribution as a per-
centage of wages. This is the individual scheme against we mea-
sure the performance of the generation insurance scheme. It has
an average pension outcome of 0.83 of average lifetime wage, with4 We model in total 145 generations per simulation, but it takes 45 years for 






h   median of 0.67, but comes with large downside risks: the 5%-
uantile of outcomes is 0.29 and the probability of a shortfall is
3%. 
The outcomes for the generation insurance scheme are shown
n the subsequent rows, grouped by three sets of parameter values.
he first group of rows varies the extent of return sharing, from
.1 to 0.3 of positive returns over the high-water mark of assets.
t leads to between 5 and 16 percentage-points lower mean out-
omes than individual DC, but at a significant reduction in risks.
or example, the probability of a shortfall is reduced from 53% to
7% for a return sharing of 20%. Moreover, the median pension out-
ome is 0.70, which is even slightly higher than the median out-
ome of 0.67 for individual DC. 
The columns labeled ‘LLA’ and ‘QLA’ give the certainty equiva-
ent values for linear and quadratic loss aversion, respectively. For
oth LLA and QLA the improvements relative to individual DC are
hree and four percentage points of final pension, depending on
he parameters. 
The final column gives the certainty-equivalent (CEQ) pension
utcome under a power utility function with a risk aversion pa-
ameter of 3. The results show considerable improvements in
EQ of the generation insurance scheme relative to the individual
cheme. The individual DC scheme has a CEQ of 0.52, whereas gen-
ration insurance has a CEQ of 0.57 in the first group of rows. 
In the second group of simulations (rows 5–7) we vary
he maximum payout that is done by the generation insur-
nce fund. Setting it too low reduces the protective power of
he fund. Setting it too high could risk emptying the insur-
nce fund, so that later generations have no benefit from it
nymore. The outcomes show that for parameter values 0.1, 0.2
nd 0.3, the outcomes taken over all simulation runs vary only
ittle. 
The bottom six rows of Table 1 show the results if we allow
or direct insurance contributions. We observe that the improve-
ents in performance are similar to those with only return shar-
ng. For example, the downside risk measures of a system with 1%
nsurance fee, 20% return sharing and 20% maximum payout are
ot better than the risk characteristics of a similar scheme without
 fixed insurance fee. At the same time, the mean pension out-
ome (0.69) is lower than under return sharing without a fixed
ee (0.72). These results provide added motivation to use return-
haring, besides the behavioral motive. For the remainder, we con-
ider parameter sets with f = 0 , so that out-of-pocket insurance
remia are avoided. 
In all, the baseline outcomes in Table 1 show that, for reason-
ble values of return sharing and maximum payouts, the riskiness
f pension outcomes is greatly reduced. This comes at the cost of a
ower mean pension outcome but if both upside potential and risk
re taken into account by means of certainty equivalent pensions
CEQ), the benefits are significant. 
.2. Average contributions for similar performance 
To capture the differences between the individual DC-scheme
nd the generation insurance scheme in one number, we compute
he level of contribution for the individual DC-plan that gives equal
isk as the generation insurance scheme. We consider two differ-
nt return-sharing parameters ( κ) and perform a grid search on
he parameter c for the individual DC-scheme that gives equal risk.
e match on three risk measures, namely linearized loss aversion,
he probability of shortfall, and power utility. Table 2 shows the
esults. 
Panel A has the results for matching on linear loss aversion, i.e.,
or a given generation insurance scheme (rows 1 and 3) we show
he statistics of the individual-DC schemes (rows 2 and 4) that
ave the same value of linear loss aversion. For 10% return shar-
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Table 1 
Baseline simulation results. 
This table shows the simulation outcomes of 10 0 0 simulations of the 100 generations, in terms of the final pension as a fraction of the average 
lifetime wage. Participants enter the pension fund at age 23 and retire at 68. Demographics and wage profiles are as in Fig. 1 . The annuity interest 
rate at retirement is equal to the short-term interest rate. Stock returns are i.i.d. and N(0.06,0.20), short-term interest rates are i.i.d and N(0.02, 
0.01). Bond returns are generated from interest rates assuming a term premium of 1% per annum and a duration of 5. The fraction in stocks starts 
at 100% and declines by 10 percentage points annually after the age of 50, to zero. The first four columns show the parameter values used for the 
simulations, i.e., the contribution rate ( c ), the insurance fee ( f ), the fraction of excess returns being shared ( κ) and the maximum fraction paid out 
of the insurance fund ( F ). The statistics are computed from the pension outcomes of all generations and all simulation runs. Each set of parameter 
uses the same risk asset returns. P(SF) is the probability of a pension shortfall. The columns LLA, QLA and PU give the certainty equivalent pension 
for linear loss aversion, quadratic loss aversion and power utility with risk aversion of 3, respectively. 
Contr. Ins. fee Sharing Max.payout Mean Median Stdev Skew Kurt p5 p10 LLA QLA P(SF) PU 
0.10 0 0 0 0.83 0.67 0.60 3.03 18.65 0.29 0.34 0.60 0.51 0.53 0.52 
0.10 0 0.1 0.2 0.78 0.70 0.44 2.82 16.63 0.32 0.38 0.63 0.54 0.41 0.57 
0.10 0 0.2 0.2 0.72 0.70 0.31 2.46 14.42 0.34 0.39 0.63 0.55 0.37 0.57 
0.10 0 0.3 0.2 0.67 0.70 0.23 1.77 11.43 0.34 0.40 0.63 0.55 0.37 0.57 
0.10 0 0.2 0.1 0.72 0.70 0.31 2.52 14.74 0.35 0.41 0.63 0.55 0.38 0.58 
0.10 0 0.2 0.2 0.72 0.70 0.31 2.46 14.42 0.34 0.39 0.63 0.55 0.37 0.57 
0.10 0 0.2 0.3 0.72 0.70 0.31 2.43 14.25 0.33 0.39 0.63 0.55 0.36 0.57 
0.09 0.01 0 0.2 0.79 0.70 0.52 3.25 20.73 0.32 0.36 0.61 0.52 0.50 0.55 
0.08 0.02 0 0.2 0.75 0.70 0.45 3.45 22.94 0.33 0.38 0.61 0.53 0.49 0.55 
0.07 0.03 0 0.2 0.70 0.70 0.37 3.61 25.20 0.33 0.38 0.61 0.53 0.50 0.55 
0.09 0.01 0.2 0.2 0.69 0.70 0.27 2.53 15.67 0.35 0.40 0.62 0.55 0.41 0.57 
0.08 0.02 0.2 0.2 0.66 0.70 0.23 2.37 15.85 0.35 0.40 0.61 0.54 0.45 0.56 
0.07 0.03 0.2 0.2 0.63 0.70 0.20 1.97 14.45 0.35 0.39 0.60 0.54 0.50 0.55 
Table 2 
Equivalent no-risk-sharing contributions. 
For the same economic assumptions as in Table 1 , this table gives a row-wise comparison of pension outcomes with and without risk sharing, for three values of 
the return-sharing parameter κ (the fraction of returns above the high-water mark being contributed to the insurance fund). Each combination of two lines matches 
a utility or risk measure of the outcomes so that the no-risk-sharing alternative is equivalent. Panel A matches pension outcomes on linear loss aversion. Panel B 
matches pension outcomes on the probability of shortfall. Panel C matches certainty equivalent pension under power utility with relative risk-aversion of 3. LLA is 





payout Mean Median Stdev Skew Kurt p5 p10 LLA QLA P(SF) PU
0.100 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.78 0.70 0.44 2.82 16.63 0.32 0.38 0.626 0.54 0.41 0.57
0.108 0.90 0.72 0.65 3.04 18.65 0.32 0.37 0.627 0.53 0.48 0.57
0.100 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.72 0.70 0.31 2.46 14.42 0.34 0.39 0.629 0.55 0.37 0.57
0.109 0.91 0.73 0.66 3.04 18.65 0.32 0.37 0.630 0.53 0.47 0.57
Panel B: Match on shortfall probability
0.100 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.78 0.70 0.44 2.82 16.63 0.32 0.38 0.63 0.54 0.406 0.57
0.120 1.00 0.80 0.72 3.04 18.65 0.35 0.41 0.66 0.55 0.405 0.63
0.100 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.72 0.70 0.31 2.46 14.42 0.34 0.39 0.63 0.55 0.369 0.57
0.127 1.06 0.85 0.77 3.04 18.65 0.37 0.43 0.67 0.57 0.367 0.67
Panel C: Match on Power utility
0.100 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.78 0.70 0.44 2.82 16.63 0.32 0.38 0.63 0.54 0.41 0.567
0.108 0.92 0.73 0.66 3.04 18.65 0.32 0.38 0.63 0.53 0.48 0.567
0.100 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.72 0.70 0.31 2.46 14.42 0.34 0.39 0.63 0.55 0.37 0.574
0.109 0.95 0.76 0.69 3.04 18.65 0.33 0.39 0.64 0.53 0.47 0.572















ng, we need an individual DC contribution rate of 10.8% to have
 similar utility. For 20% return sharing, the matching DC-scheme
as a 10.9% contribution rate. 
Panel B of Table 2 matches on the probability of shortfall, and
nds that contributions need to increase with between 2 and 2.7%-
oints to achieve the same probability of shortfall. With the caveat
hat this performance measure does not take the extent of short-all into account, generation insurance provides a large efficiency
ain in terms of the probability of shortfall. The required increase
n contribution is somewhat higher than for matching linear loss
verse utility, and is explained by the fact that the linear loss
verse utility function also takes into account the higher upside of
ndividual-DC, whereas the probability of shortfall only considers
ownside risk. 
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Fig. 3. Performance improvement of early and late generations. 
This figure shows the average differences in risk of the pension outcomes, relative to the DC scheme for the first and last 50 generations. Contribution is 10% and the 
insurance fee is 0. Per set of parameters (sharing percentage and maximum payout of the insurance fund), the relative improvement is shown in terms of the mean pension 
outcome, standard deviation, and the certainty equivalent of linear loss averse utility and power utility with a relative risk aversion coefficient of 3. The black columns have 
the difference com pared to no-insurance (only individual accounts) for the first 50 generations. The white columns are for the last 50 generations. The results are based on 





















































5 We keep the decline in fraction stocks to 10%-points per year. Panel C has the matching on CEQ-pension for the power
utility function and finds between a 0.8% to 0.9%-points con-
tribution rate for DC in order to arrive at the same certainty
equivalent. This is identical to the outcomes for linear loss
aversion. 
In all, the analysis in Table 2 shows an increase in contribution
of the individual DC-scheme to achieve equal performance that is
between 0.8%-point (same CEQ with linear loss aversion utility and
power utility) and 2.7%-point (same probability of shortfall). 
3.3. Shifts in intergenerational benefits 
The performance of the generation insurance scheme relative
to individual-DC could be biased because of a shift in intergen-
erational benefits. For example, generation insurance might make
early generations worse off on average, and subsidize the later gen-
erations. If that is the case, the outcomes would need a better
weighting over young and old generations. 
To measure shifts in intergenerational benefits we compute the
difference in performance of the generation insurance plan relative
to the individual-DC scheme, separately for the first 50 generations
and the last 50 generations. The results for three parameter config-
urations are in Fig. 3. 
Fig. 3 uses black columns for the first 50 generations and white
columns for the last 50 generations. Thus, each black/white pair
of columns shows the relative improvement of the generation in-
surance scheme relative to DC and a large difference between the
white and black column would show that the benefits do not
spread out evenly over generations. The differences turn out to be
small, and we conclude that it is clearly not the case that early
generations empty the insurance fund, at the cost of later genera-
tions. Note that in the case of a transition from a funded DB-type of
ension system, the issue of late versus early generations could be
ddressed by starting with a non-empty insurance fund of a suffi-
ient size. We discuss this together with other potential transition
roblems in Section 4 . 
.4. Comparison of risk profiles 
The generation insurance plan creates a risk profile of pension
utcomes that is different from the individual-DC plan. To illustrate
his, we use the investment mix parameter to match the outcomes
f the two schemes based on the standard deviation of the pen-
ion outcome. The investment mix parameter is the age at which
n initial 100% allocation to stocks declines with 10%-points per
ear. 
We simulate pension outcomes for a range of ages at which
he fraction in stocks starts declining, 5 and then choose the age
f the individual (DC) plan that achieves equal standard devi-
tion of the pension outcome to that of the generation insur-
nce (CDC) plan. With the same standard deviation for the base
ase, we then compare average outcomes and performance met-
ics. Contribution rates are 10% in both plans. Generation insur-
nce has 20% return sharing and a 20% maximum payout as a
raction of the insurance fund. The outcomes are in Table 3 , for
tandard deviations of the pension outcomes between 0.20 and
.40. 
Table 3 shows that for the lowest standard deviation of pen-
ion outcomes (0.20), the generation insurance scheme has a 0.02
igher pension outcome and a 24%-points lower shortfall proba-
ility. Linear loss averse utility is higher by between 3%-points, in
M.-J. Boes, A. Siegmann / Journal of Banking and Finance 92 (2018) 269–279 277 
Table 3 
Comparison of risk profiles. 
Difference in performance when the individual system and generation insurance are matched on having the same standard deviation of pension outcomes. 
Economic parameters for the simulation are as in Table 1 . Results are based on 10 0 0 simulations for 100 retiring generations. The decline in the percentage 
investment in stocks is 10%-points per year. The contribution rate is 10%, insurance fee is 0%, return sharing is 20% and maximum payout is 20%. The statistics 
are computed from the pension outcomes of all generations and all simulation runs. The age parameter for individual DC is chosen such that the standard 
deviation is closest to, but not exceeding the desired level. The age parameter for generation insurance is chosen such that the standard deviation is closest 
to, but not exceeding that of the individual DC scheme. The remaining difference in standard deviation between the two plans is in column four. The columns 
LLA, QLA and PU give the difference in certainty equivalent pension for linear loss aversion, quadratic loss aversion and power utility with relative risk aversion 
of 3, respectively. The difference in shortfall probability is in the column P(SF). 
Stdev Age parameter for 
generation insurance 
Age parameter for 
individual DC 
Difference in performance (Generation insurance minus individual-DC) 
Stdev Mean LLA QLA P(SF) PU 
0.20 43 37 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.24 0.02 
0.25 47 39 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.29 0.03 
0.30 49 41 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.28 0.03 
0.35 52 43 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.03 -0.29 0.04 
0.40 54 45 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.04 -0.29 0.04 
Table 4 
Volatility effects. 
Summary statistics of pension outcomes for different values of stock volatil- 
ity. For generation insurance, contribution is 10%, return sharing is 20% and 
maximum payout is 20%. Individual DC (panel B) has an annual contribution 
of 10.9%, which gives equal linear loss averse utility under a baseline volatility 
of 20%, see Table 2 . Stdev is the standard deviation of pension outcomes. P(SF) 
is the probability of shortfall below 70% of average wage. The columns LLA, QLA 
and PU give the certainty equivalent pension for linear loss aversion, quadratic 
loss aversion and power utility with relative risk aversion of 3, respectively. 
Volatility Mean Median Stdev LLA QLA P(SF) PU 
Panel A: Generation insurance 
0.15 0.72 0.70 0.21 0.66 0.59 0.29 0.64 
0.20 0.72 0.70 0.31 0.63 0.55 0.37 0.57 
0.25 0.72 0.70 0.43 0.60 0.51 0.44 0.50 
Panel B: Individual DC 
0.15 0.91 0.80 0.46 0.67 0.58 0.38 0.68 
0.20 0.91 0.73 0.66 0.63 0.53 0.47 0.57 




































































m  erms of certainty equivalent pension. For power utility, the in-
rease in certainty equivalent utility is 2%-point. For higher stan-
ard deviations, the extent of the differences increase accordingly.
his illustrates how the generation insurance plan is not merely a
isk-reduction plan, but an improvement in efficiency: at similar
evels of risk (measured by standard deviation), the pension out-
ome is better. 
.5. Stock return volatility effects 
The return-sharing scheme that we analyze works well for the
iven set of parameters and modeling of economic risks. However,
conomic parameters such as the volatility of stock returns are in-
erently uncertain, and the relative performance of one pension
cheme to another could be sensitive to how the economy devel-
ps. Specifically, if future volatility is higher or lower than the his-
orical average, the performance difference might be quite differ-
nt, ex post. We assess the sensitivity of the two pension schemes
or this effect by simulating with different volatility parameters.
he contribution parameters for the simulation are set at the level
here individual-DC and generation insurance have an equal aver-
ge linear loss averse utility under a stock return volatility of 20%,
s in Table 2 . Then, we run the simulations with one lower and
ne higher volatility parameter. Table 4 shows the results. 
A lower volatility than expected (15% instead of 20%) leads to
ower pension risks in both schemes. The standard deviation of the
ension outcome under generation insurance drops from 0.31 to
.21. For the individual DC-scheme, it drops from 0.66 to 0.46. For higher than expected volatility (25% instead of 20%), the effect
s exactly the opposite. Standard deviations increase from 0.31 to
.43 and from 0.66 to 0.90, respectively. Moreover, the measures
f certainty equivalent pension behave accordingly, with a slightly
arger sensitivity for individual DC. In all, the generation insurance
cheme has no excess sensitivity to ex post differences in volatility
ompared to the individual defined-contribution scheme. 
. Implementation issues 
There are a number of practical and policy considerations that
arrant discussion when considering the merits of a generation in-
urance scheme. We discuss the issues related to the purchase of
 pension annuity, investment risk management and the transition
rom an existing pension plan. 
.1. The pension annuity 
In practice, the pension annuity at retirement can be purchased
rom a commercial insurance company. However, it might be more
eneficial for pensioners to have a separate non-profit entity pro-
iding the pension annuity. It can operate as a defined-benefit pen-
ion plan, and have lower costs than a commercial solution. More-
ver, such an entity could provide the insurance against longevity
isk. The portfolio is not necessarily risk-free, to allow for indexa-
ion ambitions to be pursued. Most of the assets would be hedged
or interest-rate risk, to match the interest-rate sensitivity of the
iabilities. The entity would retain some of the opaqueness of a
B-system, but with a scope limited to only retired participants.
lso, having only retirees in the post-retirement plan limits the in-
ergenerational conflicts. 
Part-time employees, of employees with less than a working life
f 45 years with the same pension fund, receive payouts in propor-
ion to their capital accumulated in their individual account. 
In practice, one might not want to have an insurance payout
surprise” at retirement, but rather a payout mechanism that is
tructured so that soon-to-retire participants can form proper ex-
ectations about the pension they will receive. For example, a pre-
iction could be communicated about the pension level at retire-
ent and the payout to be received, depending on the value of
he individual account, the interest rate, and the assets in the in-
urance fund. 
.2. Risk management and portfolio choice 
To facilitate a smooth conversion from a pension capital to a
early pension, it would be beneficial to implement a form of risk
anagement for the interest rate risk in the plan. This could be


















































































































B  implemented by locking-in annuity rates well before the retire-
ment age, so that sudden changes in the pension outcome due to
interest rate changes are mitigated. 
Another form of risk management that is beneficial to the pen-
sion scheme is the choice of investment mix over the life cycle.
Traditionally, the literature claims that young people should fully
invest in risky assets, see for example Campbell and Viceira (2003) .
The share in risky assets declines over time, due to the diminish-
ing share of labor income in their total discounted wealth. This
is what we have used in the analyses above, and it is consistent
with typical financial advice for personal financial planning. How-
ever, in contrast with that advice, a report by NEST Corporation
(2010) finds that young people are actually quite sensitive to nomi-
nal losses in their pension savings and would rather not have risky
assets when they are young. If these insights are true in general,
one would want to adapt the asset mix in such a way that large
stock investments are avoided initially, e.g., for the first five years.
Another possibility is to waive the asset-related contribution to the
generation insurance fund during the early working years. 
4.3. Transitioning from existing pension plans 
Transitioning from a DC-plan should be the easiest, as pension
assets are clearly marked as such. Existing active (non-retired) par-
ticipants continue to pay a contribution to their individual pension
account, but by paying an insurance fee and/or the upside return
sharing they obtain rights to the insurance payouts at retirement.
Those rights would be proportional to the years in the new sys-
tem. Given the assumption of nominal loss aversion we theoreti-
cally would prefer a setup without fixed insurance fees (i.e. f = 0
in our model) but to build up a reasonably sized generation insur-
ance fund, we could imagine an implementation period in which
the participants pay an insurance premium as well. 
The transition from a defined-benefit (DB) system is little more
complex. Active participants to a DB-system build up pension
rights, not assets, and these rights have to be converted into assets.
The assets then have to be split in an individual part and an insur-
ance part. There are issues in the split in assets between (i) retired
and non-retired participants, (ii) young and old participants, and
(iii) the individual account and the insurance funds. 
First, splitting the pension assets between retired and non-
retired participants can be done on the basis of the actuarial value
of the nominal pension rights. The allocation of the surplus or
shortfall needs to be negotiated between the retired and active
participants, and the sponsor. Such a negotiation is similar to the
yearly negotiation that takes place implicitly in the DB-pension
when contribution and indexation policies have to be determined.
After the split, the assets of the retired generation are placed in a
special payout-fund. 
Second, the total pension rights of non-retired participants need
to be distributed over the generations. A complication is the fact
that the actuarial value of pension rights of the younger generation
(say, below 40) is usually lower than the present value of the con-
tributions paid into the fund. The reason is that under DB, pension
rights accrue with a fixed percentage per year, while the actuarial
value increases with age. For older participants, the yearly increase
in pension rights is worth more than their contribution. This is an
essential feature of a DB-fund and drives the intergenerational sol-
idarity embedded in DB. A negotiation about the asset value of the
pension rights for young and old generation will have to find the
middle ground between the present value of the contributions and
the actuarial value. 
A final part of the transition is the allocation of assets between
the individual account and the insurance fund. The desired initial
size of the insurance fund determines the total fraction of assets
that need to go in the insurance fund, and the contribution of eacheneration is a function of the expected benefits of insurance. If
he pension fund has a nominal funding ratio greater than 1, the
urplus could be used to fill the insurance fund. 
. Conclusion 
We analyze a risk-sharing scheme that captures benefits of in-
ergenerational risk sharing, but is attractive for real-world par-
icipants by averting out-of-pocket transfers between generations.
oreover, the scheme retains the simplicity of an individual retire-
ent savings scheme by having a generation insurance fund that
akes in insurance contributions and a fraction of returns above
 high-water mark. It pays out when a generation has a pension
hortfall. Economic ownership of this fund lies with the fund’s re-
irees. 
The generation-insurance scheme provides protection in bad
imes which is appreciated by the efficiency measures that we
valuate. Unlike traditional DB-systems, the insurance is not fi-
anced by out-of-pocket expenses of active participants or employ-
rs but by investment returns of all individual participants in good
imes. 
A key benefit of the behavioral design is that the rules govern-
ng the generation insurance fund can be explained in relatively
imple terms. For example, it can be explained as a health insur-
nce company that obtains insurance premiums, but only pays out
o people who suffer from health problems and need treatment.
ikewise, the generation insurance fund takes in insurance premi-
ms and pays out if the investment returns or current interest rate
ead to pension problems. Using a high-water mark for insurance
ontributions avoids nominal decreases in pension capital, while
voiding complex return-smoothing rules or direct transfers be-
ween generations. 
The design has a positive externality in that the insurance cap-
tal is build up in good times and released in bad times. A pension
cheme that embeds such a feature is worthwhile to pursue for
he benefit of participants and public welfare. In fact, the buffer
hat defined-benefit pension funds should hold to withstand ad-
erse market conditions is a reflection of the same principle. Re-
urns in good years increase the buffer, so that shocks can be bet-
er absorbed in bad years. 
A remaining question is to what extent the behavioral design
omes close to the theoretical maximum for intergenerational ben-
fits in a collective pension system. The answer to this question
ould give policy makers an idea of the extent of the trade-off be-
ween public support of the risk sharing mechanism and overall
fficiency. We leave this as a topic for future research. 
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